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Which Scientist Do You Believe?
Process Alternatives in
Technological Controversies*
Thomas G. Field, Jr.**
Introduction
Does Bendectin cause birth defects? Do ailments later suffered by
those who served in Desert Storm constitute a "syndrome"? Is DNA
evidence reliable enough for use in criminal trials? Does facilitated
communication reflect the thoughts of autistic patients or those of
facilitators? Such questions regularly make front page news. 1
"Which Scientist Do You Believe?" is a key to each. Recently, 2.
over thirty conferees representing diverse disciplines3 and experience
met to consider processes for addressing that underlying question in
widely varying legal and social contexts.
A symposium on the "Science Court,"4 was the immediate
antecedent of the conference. Papers published there identify but do
not resolve issues such as the extent to which facts and values can, or
need, be separated. 5 Thus, prospects for a live forum where they
could be aired was discussed even before publication. Once Arthur
Kantrowitz obtained Hertz Foundation support, this became feasible.
Funded in part by the Fannie and John Hertz Foundation and in part by the
Ethical, Legal and Social Issues component of the Department of Energy Human
Gefiome Project. We are grateful for their support. Also, I thank Jennifer A. Kispert
for careful notes that were very helpful in preparing this paper.
** Professor Field is a founding member of the Franklin Pierce Law Center faculty.
He received his A.B. (Chemistry) and J.D. from West Virginia University and his
LL.M. (Trade Regulation) from New York University. A former patent examiner, he
is also an experienced arbitrator and mediator.
I See generally, e.g., Technical Risk in the Mass Media, 5(3) Risk (Allan Mazur,
ed. 1994).
2 October 6-7, 1994; see Prorgam, infra, at 183.
3 Several individuals conferees hold degrees in diverse disciplines; see infra at 184.
4 4(2) Risk (1993).
5 See, e.g., Carl F. Cranor, Science Courts, Evidentiary Procedures and Mixed
Science-Policy Decisions, id. at 113 (1993) and Sheila Jasanoff, Procedural Choices
in Regulatory Science, id at 143. Unfortunately, neither could attend.
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Process Alternatives in Context
Kantrowitz opened the conference, noting that failure to separate
facts and values in scientific disputes allows both scientists6 and
policy makers7 to advance non-technical agendas with claims of
expertise. He urged that this can cause grave and multifaceted social
harm and observed that better separation is possible if we try.8
Still, disputes that harbor technical issues do not necessarily turn on
scientific credibility. For example, if fear of electromagnetic radiation
reduces residential property values near power lines, its scientific
rationality should be irrelevant in actions to recover for landowners'
economic losses. 9 Likewise, people who wish to teach creationism in
public schools usually admit religious goals, and scientific credibility
becomes irrelevant under the First Amendment. 10
In most controversies, someone must decide which technical
questions, if any, need answers. This was underscored by Dalton
Paxman who discussed tensions between Members of Congress who
seek to require, e.g., technical analysis to support environmental
regulation and those who wish to preserve legislation that skirts
technical issues. 1' It was also emphasized by Kristin Shrader-Frechette,
who urged that those affected by decisions should be, in the name of
procedural fairness, entitled to a say in framing issues. 12
Available resources must also be juggled with the need for technical
accuracy. In much the same vein, Sidney Shapiro discussed how
additional process, such as using advisory committees, may cause
undue regulatory delay. 13 He argued for agency latitude.
6 Infira at 103.
7 Id.; see also Shapiro, infra at 132 and Field, supra note 6, at 100.
8 Infira at 108.
9 See, e.g., Linda J. Orel, Perceived Risks of EMFs and Landowner
Compensation, 6 Risk 79 (1995).
10 See U.S. Const. amend. I, quoted, infia at 108.
11 Infra at 163; see, e.g., at 176.
12 Infia at 113; see, e.g., at 118.
This was the topic of a earlier conference. Entitled "Public Participation in Risk
Management: Ethics, Science and Law," its papers, including ones by Lubbers, Shapiro
and Shrader-Frechette, appear in the first three issues of Risk
As revealed by, e.g., the Los Angeles riots that followed the recent Rodney King
police brutality case, lack of faith in process can indeed have serious consequences.
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Yet another basic issue underlying technical accuracy is the degree
of confidence with which facts must be established. 14 In most civil and
regulatory actions, a party who wishes to disturb the status quo usually
needs to establish critical facts only by a preponderance of evidence. In
contrast, before criminal sanctions can be imposed, prosecutors must
establish needed facts beyond a reasonable doubt. However, before
facts can be placed on the scale, they must be admitted into evidence.
Scientific Evidence in Legal Proceedings
Peter Huber 15 and Albert Scherr 16 discussed the admissibility of
scientific evidence in civil and criminal litigation, respectively. As
explained by Scherr, scientists in admissibility hearings say why they
think that evidence is, e.g., reliable or unreliable. Then, lawyers unlikely
to have technical training cross-examine, often with experts at their
sides, 17 and judges even less likely to have technical training decide
whether contested evidence can be presented to juries. The topic was
both important and timely.
A recent U.S. Supreme Court case was the focus of Huber's talk.18
It is likely to influence the admissibility of scientific evidence more than
any case in 70 years. Yet, as Huber noted, its impact is so far unclear -
particularly because advocates for and against stringent standards of
admissibility both claim victory. Huber also said that many
mischaracterize the case as involving the right to jury trials. Others,
13 Infra at 125.
14 Its fundamental nature is well illustrated by an exchange between John F. Metz &
H. Christopher Frey and Carl Cranor over Cranor's book, Regulating Toxic
Substances; see respectively, 5 Risk 75 (review) and 81 (reply).
15 Infra at 109.
16 See, e.g., Anthony Flint, Science's Role in Courtrooms Reassessed, the Boston
Globe, Oct. 20, 1994, at 1. At 17, Scherr is quoted as saying-
Let's say that you establish that with DNA evidence there's a 1-in-
40,000 hance that it was someone other than the defendant. Well, how
does that square with the idea of reasonable doubt? If you put a number
on reasonable doubt... you'll totally change the legal system.
17 See also, Alvin S. Weinstein et al., Product Liability- A Study of the Interaction
of Law and Technology 10-13 (1977) (Final Report to the National Science
Foundation). At 13, the authors say "The... expert has been described as a resource,
not a tool, as a co-equal partner with counsel, not as a filler of an evidentiary gap...."
18 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 113 S.Ct. 2786 (1993).
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however, expressed concern that raising the standards for admissibility
could amount to raising the burden of proof in civil trials.
Scherr focused on the admissibility of DNA evidence. This, too,
was timely insofar as it had been debated in the widely-reported
Simpson trial. He said that DNA evidence was first used in the 80 's
and was called a "genetic fingerprint." After being quickly admitted in
several southern cases, it encountered difficulty in the North where
more money is available for indigent defense. A New Hampshire
case 9 in which Scherr served as both trial and appellate counsel is
entering its fourth year and has cost both sides over $100,000 for
experts alone. Scherr also discussed a recent National Academy of
Sciences controversy about DNA evidence that seems to confirm
Kantrowitz's opening warning.2 0
Such issues have counterparts in legislative and regulatory settings.
Paxman recounted Congressional initiatives for "good" science. 2 1
Also, Jeffrey Lubbers, gave considerable attention to a recommendation
for improved regulatory science2 2 from the National Performance
Review overseen by Vice President Gore.23
Alternative Dispute Resolution
Conference planning began with the idea that Kantrowitz had never
contemplated a forum to resolve legal or policy issues. 24 Proposed
decision makers were more akin to jurors than judges.2 5 Also, to the
19 State v. Vandebogart, 136 N.H. 365 (1992).
20 See also, e.g., Academy Splits on Risk, 259 Science 759 (1993) (concerning
Issues in Risk Assessment (1993)):
(NAS) Committees usually strive for consensus. Congress, the
federal agencies, and private groups pay for NAS reports so they can et
recommendations, spoken with one voice. So when you see a new N9
report that not only has dissenting opinions, but even offers "rnajority"
and "minority" recommendations, you know that loud debates ranged
behind close ddoors.
21 Infia at 174.
22 Infraat 159.
23 Vice President Al Gore, Creating a Government that Works Better & Costs Less
58 (1993).
24 See Arthur Kantrowitz, Proposal for an Institution for Scientific Judgment, 156
Science 763 (1967).
25 See Thomas G. Field, Jr., The Science Court is Dead; Long Live the Science
Court! 4 Risk 95, 99 (1993).
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extent that, e.g., jurisdiction was ad hoc, arbitration was even more
apt. Moreover, Allan Mazur had observed that academic experiments
had proven more mediatory than adjudicatory.26
This recalled a much earlier conference. Entitled, "Arbitration of
Patent and Other Technological Disputes," 27 it had been scheduled
for soon after the Science Court Colloquium2 8 and was also intended
to explore a comparatively novel process. 29 After the Colloquium,
hoping that he would inspire other law/science process innovation, I
asked Kantrowitz to speak. He agreed, 3 0 and twenty years later, the
topics seemed even more related. This sparked specific consideration of
alternative dispute resolution (ADR).
However characterized, the "Science Court" and many other ways
of resolving technical disputes3 1 are literally forms of ADR. Norman
Balmer defined the basic forms usually contemplated by the term -
negotiation, mediation and arbitration. 32 Citing their enormous
flexibility, he noted the capacity of ADR to help firms resolve disputes
and get on with their businesses. Regarding intellectual property
generally, he mentioned that the outcome of disputes can indirectly
affect the public and that legislation was needed to ensure that patent
disputes could be arbitrated. 33
As Kantrowitz's proposal has "withered on the vine,"34 traditional
ADR has become increasingly popular.3 5 For example, Lubbers noted
26 See The Science Court: Reminiscence and Retrospective, 4 Risk 161, 168
(1993).
27 See Thomas G. Field, Jr., Introduction, 18(4) Idea 1, 2 (1977).
28 Nov. 29-30 and Sept. 19-21, 1976, respectively.
29 See, e.g., Field, supra note 27, at 3-4 (discussing expanded court review of
patent arbitration awards).
30 See Arthur Kantrowitz, The Science Court - Another Alternative, op cit., 61.
31 E.g., NAS panels or advisory committees. Regarding the latter, see, e.g., Sidney
A. Shapiro, Public Accountability of Advisory Committees, 1 Risk 189, 190 (raises
the problem of entrusting public decisions to private parties).
32 Infia at 147.
33 See 35 U.S.C. § 294.
34 Supra note 23, at 60.
35 See, e.g., Thomas G. Field, Jr. & Michael Rose, Prospects for ADR in Patent
Disputes.... 32 Idea 309 (reports that a larger fraction of patent attorneys favored
ADR, particularly mediation, in 1991 than in 1981).
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that recent legislation promotes ADR in agencies, themselves a "fourth
branch of government" encompassing incredibly diverse and flexible
procedures. 3 6 Yet, binding arbitration has little potential: It is one
thing to have private neutrals adjudicate patent disputes and quite
another to have them ultimately resolve purely public controversies. 37
In contrast, the potential for mediator-facilitated negotiation has
hardly been tapped. For example, Rena Steinzor recounted its novel use
to resolve key issues underlying Superfund reauthorization. 3 8 Major
social and economic impacts of that legislation on widely disparate
stakeholders made agreement unlikely, but Steinzor described how a
skilled mediator was able to secure consensus on most important issues.
She suggested that exclusion of public authorities was helpful, if not
critical, to candid negotiations. She also related how shared discontent
with the federal government had a unifying effect. 39
The Science Court Visited and Revisited
Allan Mazur nominated a technical controversy for a "Science
Court" experiment 40 - whether trained facilitators convey their own
thoughts or those of autistic individuals. After viewing illustrative
evidence for opposing sides, no conferee objected. I
Scherr also said that rules concerning neutral experts would permit
most trial judges to convene mini-science-courts to resolve admissibility
issues. However, he speculated that few would have funds - assuming,
e.g., that their skepticism could be overcome.
4 1
Itzak Jacoby spoke perhaps most strongly in support of a "Science
Court." He cited flaws in judicial processes for resolving ever-more-
expensive and otherwise difficult decisions about the clinical utility and
36 Infra at 146.
37 See supra note 23, at 51, n. 7; see also, Shapiro, supra note 31.
38 Still, the reauthorization bill (along with many others) did not pass; see, e.g.,
Paxman, infra, at 163.
39 See Rena 1. Steinzor, The Reauthorization of Superfund Can the Deal of the
Century be Saved? 25 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,016, 10,021-28 (1995).
40 He nevertheless reaffirmed his "agnostic" position; see supra note 26, at 165.
41 See also, Maurice Rosenberg, Improving the Courts' Ability to Absorb
Scientific Information, in Science and Technology Advice to the President, Congress,
and the Judiciary 480 (William T. Golden, ed. 1993).
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compensability of new medical technologies. Yet, he found such flaws
fully matched by shortcomings in scientific and professional fora. He
explained how attempts to approximate the "Science Court" at the
National Institutes of Health have fallen short42 and urged tests of a
process more faithful to its original tenets.
Conclusions
Conference discussions were lively, but outright hostility to
"Science Court" proceedings was not evident.43 This may be related
to similar procedures having been tried, both here44 and in Canada4 5
- if not with great success, at least without dire consequences. Even so,
more is sure to be involved.
For years, I have wondered why people have not experimented
more with science-court-type procedures or why patent attorneys who
complain about the technical ignorance of judges and juries do not use
arbitration. The answers now seem closely related.
As Balmer urges, willingness and ability to settle are critical. On
what do those turn? Cost and delay are very important,4 6 but other
factors may control. Consider, e.g. advantages that parties forego, vis-
a-vis less well-heeled opponents, when they agree on submitting to
procedures less expensive than litigation. Consider, too, the incentive
for those with weak cases to insist on inexpert decisions.
Where Machiavellian motives can play a role, something more than
a threat of litigation is needed to encourage ADR.4 7 Even when such
motives seem unlikely, additional encouragement is needed.4 8 For
42 Infra at 139-40.
43 But two highly skeptical individuals could not attend; see supra note 5.
44 See, e.g., Sidney A. Shapiro, Scientific Issues and the Function of Hearing
Procedures: Evaluating the FDA's Public Board of Inquiry, 1986 Duke LJ. 288.
45 Conrad G. Brunk, Lawrence Haworth & Brenda Lee, Value Assumptions in Risk
Assessment: A Case Study of the Alachlor Controversy (1991) (Haworth attended.)
46 Field & Rose, supra note 35, at 315 (Figure 1).
47 See, e.g., Phillip Sperber, Overlooked Negotiating Tools, 20 Les Nouvelles 81
(1985). On agreeing to ADR in patent dispute, he observes, id.:[I]f patent validity or infringement is questionable, why take a chance
with an arbitration expert wio will know exactly how weak the patent is
and how dubious infringement is? It makes sense to take one's chances
with a judge inexperienced in the technical and legal aspects involved.
48 E.g, court-annexed mediation and arbitration, or the kinds of initiatives discussed
infia by Lubbers.
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example, unfamiliarity with a process strongly interferes with its
adoption. Attorneys without ADR experience have been found less
inclined to use it.4 9 Moreover, their inclinations strongly, and
negatively, correlate with the amount in dispute. 50
We should therefore not be surprised that, lacking much if any
stake, no conferee objected to Mazur's candidate for a "Science Court"
proceeding. Nor need we impugn the motives of those who strongly
resisted initially proposed experiments. That procedure was novel for
lawyers, policy makers and scientists alike, 5 1 and many saw the stakes
as very high. No doubt, this has colored the debate ever since.
On reflection, if I were now designing a forum for resolving
disputes for which the "Science Court" was proposed, I would choose
something more clearly akin to arbitration. Technically- and legally-
trained advocates would define and refine procedures. They would also
carefully frame factual issues to minimize, if not avoid, giving
scientists inappropriate matters to decide and last, but certainly not
least, would themselves select panel members. An administrative entity
would be helpful but not critical. 52 Proceedings would be public and
findings, if warranted, could be subject to regulatory or court
review. 53 As stressed by Balmer, flexibility is the hallmark of ADR:
Modifications can satisfy varying needs. The biggest problem, as always
in public disputes, is: Who represents "the public'?54
Yet, the bottom line, as I see it, is that those who advance novel
processes must start with small stakes. 55 Once bugs are worked out
and shibboleths put to rest, 56 the stakes can be raised.
49 Field & Rose, supra note 35, at 320.
50 Id. at 321.
51 Id. at 324.
52 See, e.g., Richard M. Reilly, The Administrative Machinery of the American
Arbitration Association, 18(4) Idea 23, 25 (1976).
53 See supra note 29; see also Rosenberg, supra note 41, at 481-2.
54 See, e.g., Goyan v. Pacific Legal Foundation, 664 F.2d 1221 (4th Cir. 1981).
See also, supra note 12 and accompanying text.
55 Yet, the stakes cannot be too small, or tests will be useless. This is related to court
demands for cases or controversies; see U.S. Const., art. III, § 2.
56 See also, Field & Rose, supra note 35, at 321.
